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Abstract
Demichelis & Weibull (AER 2008) show that adding lexicographic lying costs to
coordination games with cheap talk yields a sharp prediction: only the efficient
outcome is evolutionarily stable. I show that this result is caused by the discon-
tinuity of preferences rather than by small lying costs per se. Finally, I discuss
why discontinuity may not be an appealing assumption in evolutionary models.
KEYWORDS: Lexicographic preferences, evolutionary stability, cheap talk. JEL:
C73.
The game of Figure 1 is an example of a symmetric two-player coor-
dination game in which each pure action is the best reply to itself. This
game admits three pure strict equilibria: the Pareto-dominant (a, a), and the
Pareto-dominated (b, b) and (c, c). Intuition suggests that equilibrium (a, a)
is more plausible, especially if players can communicate before playing the
∗I express my deep gratitude to Itai Arieli, Stefano Demichelis, Erik Mohlin, Thomas
Norman, Jo¨rgen Weibull, and two anonymous referees for many useful discussions. The
author declares that he has no relevant material or financial interests that relate to the
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2a b c
a 3 0 0
b 0 2 0
c 0 0 1
Fig. 1: Payoff Matrix (pi) of a Symmetric Two-Player Coordination Game
game. However, all the above-mentioned equilibria satisfy all the standard
(non-evolutionary) refinements, even when the game is extended to include a
pre-play cheap-talk stage in which each player simultaneously sends a message
before playing the game.
Several papers use the refinement of evolutionary stability to study such
games. A symmetric Nash equilibrium is an evolutionarily stable strategy if
it is a strictly better reply to all other best replies than those replies are to
themselves (Maynard Smith & Price, 1973). The motivation for this notion
is that a stable strategy, if adopted by a population of players, cannot be
invaded by any alternative strategy that is initially rare. The existing literature
(Section I) shows that non-efficient equilibria are also evolutionarily stable. In
an influential paper, Demichelis & Weibull (2008) (henceforth, DW) show that
enriching the model with lexicographic lying costs yields a sharp prediction:
only the efficient outcome is evolutionarily stable (Section II).
The main contribution of this note (Section III) is the observation that
DW’s prediction does not hold for continuous lying costs: the set of stable out-
comes remains qualitatively the same as in the cheap-talk model. I conclude
in Section IV by showing that various kinds of discontinuous preferences (un-
related to lying costs) induce efficiency in coordination games, and that such
discontinuities may not be an appealing assumption in evolutionary models.
I. Coordination Games with Cheap Talk
Definitions. Strategy σ is evolutionarily stable if for each strategy τ 6= σ,
we have: (1) pi (σ, σ) ≥ pi (τ, σ) (i.e., σ is a symmetric Nash equilibrium),
and (2) pi (σ, σ) = pi (τ, σ) implies that pi (σ, τ) > pi (τ, τ). It is neutrally stable
(Maynard Smith, 1982) if the last inequality is replaced with a weak inequality.
3Taylor & Jonker (1978) show that evolutionary stability implies asymptotic
stability in the replicator dynamics (see extensions to other payoff-monotonic
dynamics in Cressman, 1997; Sandholm, 2010): any sufficiently small change
in the composition of the population results in a movement back toward the
evolutionarily stable strategy. Thomas (1985) extends the notion of stability
from strategies to outcomes. A payoff profile (outcome) β is evolutionarily
stable if there exists a set of neutrally stable strategies such that each strategy
in the set yields payoff β and is a strictly better reply to any other best reply
outside the set.1
Results. Schlag (1993) and Banerjee & Weibull (2000) characterize stable
outcomes of coordination games with cheap talk. They show that if each player
has two actions and the alphabet (the finite set of possible messages) is large,
then only approximately efficient outcomes are evolutionarily stable. However,
if there are more than two actions, then such games also admit inefficient
evolutionarily stable strategies.2 Each such strategy must use all the messages
in the alphabet with positive probability (otherwise, the behavior against the
unused messages “drifts” until it becomes favorable for mutants to use these
messages and play the Pareto-dominant action profile). In particular, the
following strategy, σ∗, is evolutionarily stable in the game of Figure 1: players
send each message with equal probability, and play c if they have sent the
same message, and b otherwise.3
1 Formally, outcome β is evolutionarily stable if there exists a closed and non-empty set of
strategies X, such that each strategy σ ∈ X satisfies: (1) pi (σ, σ) = β, (2) neutral stability,
and (3) for each strategy τ : pi (σ, σ) = pi (τ, σ) and pi (σ, τ) = pi (τ, τ) imply that τ ∈ X.
Thomas (1985) (see also Weibull, 1995) shows that such sets are asymptotically stable.
2 Demichelis (2013) has shown that when players play long repeated coordination games,
then only efficient outcomes are evolutionarily stable (even when there are more than two
actions).
3 Similarly to Schlag (1993), I use the reduced normal form in which a strategy does not
specify what action a player would take in the counter factual case when he sends another
message than the message specified by his strategy. The results are qualitatively the same
(but the presentation of the results is more cumbersome) in the alternative full normal
form (a` la DW) in which a strategy also specifies actions in counter factual cases. The
translation of our results to the setup of full normal form is sketched as followed. Given
a reduced-form pure strategy s, let S˜ (s) be the set of full-form pure strategies that are
4II. Lexicographic Lying Costs
DW adapt the cheap-talk model by assuming that some messages have a pre-
specified meaning regarding the action that the sender intends to play, and
that there are small lying costs. Specifically, DW assume that the alphabet
contains a non-informative message φ that is always “truthful”, for each action
(say, a) there exists a message that “promises” to play this action (denoted by
aˆ), and a player suffers a positive lying cost if he sends message aˆ and plays
an action other than a. The lying costs are modeled lexicographically: only
when comparing two outcomes with the same material payoffs (pi) do players
care about the lying costs, and in this case, they prefer the outcome with
the smaller lying cost. Finally, DW use the following solution concept: an
outcome is stable if it is (1) an outcome of a Nash equilibrium component of
the lexicographic game, and (2) each equilibrium in this component is neutrally
stable with respect to the material payoffs.4
DW (Proposition 1) show that this adaptation yields a sharp prediction:
the Pareto-dominant payoff is the unique stable outcome of the lexicographic
game. The intuition of this result is as follows. Recall that each inefficient
equivalent to s (different from s only in counter factual cases): each full-form strategy
s˜ ∈ S˜ (s) sends the same message m as strategy s, and chooses the same action as strategy
s after any history of messages in which the player’s own message is m. Given a reduced-
form mixed strategy σ, let Σ˜ (σ) be the set of full-form mixed strategies that are equivalent
to σ: a full-form mixed strategy σ˜ is in Σ˜ (σ) iff for each pure reduced-form strategy s,
σ˜
(
S˜ (s)
)
=
∑
s˜∈S˜(s) σ˜ (s˜) = σ (s). Minor adaptations to the proof of the main observation
in Section III show that it holds also in the setup of full normal form; i.e., S˜ (σ) is an
evolutionarily stable set (Thomas, 1985) in G.
4 The first requirement (being a Nash equilibrium of the lexicographic game) implicitly
assumes (a` la Volij, 2002) that the influence of mutants is smaller than the influence of
the lying costs. This is demonstrated in the symmetric game of Figure 2 (adapted from
Samuelson & Swinkels, 2003). Strategy a is not a Nash equilibrium of the lexicographic
game (because strategy b yields the same material payoffs and higher secondary payoffs
against strategy a). Observe that incumbents who follow strategy a strictly outperform
mutants who follow strategy b in any post-entry population (i.e., pi (a, (1− ) · a+  · b) >
pi (b, (1− ) · a+  · b) for each  > 0). However, DW’s notion of stability does not allow this
advantage against mutants to compensate for the disadvantage in the secondary payoffs.
Finally, note that under the opposite assumption (i.e., mutants are more influential than
lying costs, a` la Binmore & Samuelson, 1992) one can show that the set of evolutionarily
stable outcomes in the lexicographic game is the same as in the cheap-talk game with no
lying costs.
5a b a b
a 1 1 a 0 0
b 1 0 b 1 1
pi (material payoffs) w (secondary payoffs)
Fig. 2: Strategy a is not “DW stable” in this symmetric lexicographic game.
stable strategy must use all messages with positive probability. Assume to
the contrary that there exists a Nash equilibrium of the lexicographic game
in which all the messages are used with positive probability. By definition,
message φ does not induce any lying cost. The lexicographic preferences imply
that players cannot be indifferent between two pure strategies with different
lying costs. Thus, all messages must induce zero lying costs. In particular,
a player who sends message aˆ (bˆ) always plays action a (b). This leads to a
contradiction: if a player sends bˆ and his opponent sends aˆ, then the player
achieves a strictly higher payoff by deviating to play action a instead of b.
III. Continuous Lying Costs
In this section, I show that DW’s prediction does not hold for continuous lying
costs. For each  > 0 define G as the coordination game with communication
in which the (continuous) payoff function, pi, is equal to pi (the material payoffs
of Table 1) minus  times the lying costs (see Chen et al., 2008 for a similar
model of lying costs). In what follows, I show that for any sufficiently small
 the game G admits an evolutionarily stable strategy σ close to σ∗. For
concreteness, Table 1 describes σ in an example in which the alphabet includes
four messages
{
φ, aˆ, bˆ, cˆ
}
and there is a fixed lying cost equal to 1.
The sketch of the proof of this result is as follows. Strategy σ∗ is an isolated
quasi-strong equilibrium (i.e., it assigns a positive probability to every pure
strategy that is a best reply to σ∗), and this implies (Jansen, 1981) that σ∗ is an
essential equilibrium (i.e., all nearby continuous games admit an equilibrium
close to σ∗). Thus, game G admits a nearby Nash equilibrium σ. Moreover,
the quasi-strongness of σ∗ implies that, for a sufficiently small , strategy σ
has the same support as σ∗. This implies that σ has the following properties:
6m Prσ (m) pi (σ, σ| sendingm) Prσ (lying |m) pi (σ, σ|m)
φ 14 +

2
7
4 − 2 0 74 − 2
aˆ 14 − 2 74 + 2 1 74 − 2
bˆ 14 +

4
7
4 − 4 14 + 4 74 − 2
cˆ 14 − 4 74 + 4 34 + 4 74 − 2
Tab. 1: The evolutionarily stable strategy σ for an alphabet
{
φ, aˆ, bˆ, cˆ
}
and a
fixed lying cost equal to 1 (which is paid in case a player “promises” to
play one action and instead plays another action; this cost is multiplied
by  in the game G). To simplify the presentation, the table neglects
terms that have a magnitude of o (2). The exact probabilities of the
messages in σ are: Pr (cˆ) = 14 − ·(2+)8−42 , Pr
(
bˆ
)
= 14 +
·(2+−2)
(8−4·2)·(1+) ,
Pr (aˆ) = 14 − 2 + 
2
8−42 .
(1) at the second stage, players play as in σ∗: c if they sent the same message
and b otherwise, and (2) at the first stage, each message’s probability of being
sent is adjusted relative to the equal probabilities in σ∗: messages that yield
higher expected lying costs are sent with slightly lower probabilities, such that
all messages yield the same expected payoff in G given the play at the second
stage.
Finally, minor adaptations to the proofs of Schlag (1993) and Banerjee &
Weibull (2000) (which show why σ∗ is evolutionarily stable in G0) imply that
σ is evolutionarily stable in G. The intuition is as follows: (1) each strategy
that induces different behavior at the second stage is strictly outperformed
(because the second-stage behavior of σ is the unique strict best reply against
σ), and (2) each strategy τ 6= σ that differs in the distribution of messages
at the first stage is strictly outperformed in any nearby post-entry population.
The reason for the latter observation is that if a message m is sent with higher
(lower) probability in τ than in σ, then it is played more (less) often by
the opponent in the post-entry population relative to the pre-entry frequency,
7and, as a result, conditional on sending message m, there is a higher (lower)
probability of facing an opponent who sends the same message and playing
the worse action profile (c, c). As a result, the expected payoff conditional
on sending message m is lower (higher) in the post-entry population than in
the pre-entry payoff. Thus, the “mutant” strategy τ assigns higher (lower)
probabilities to messages that induce lower (higher) expected payoffs, and, as
a result, it is outperformed by the incumbent strategy σ.
Thus, any continuous game with small lying costs admits an evolutionarily
stable strategy close to σ∗. Similarly, one can show that every evolutionar-
ily stable strategy of the cheap-talk game is a limit of evolutionarily stable
strategies in every converging sequence of games with continuous small lying
costs.5
IV. Discussion of Discontinuity
Observe that various kinds of discontinuities (unrelated to lying costs) yield
the same sharp prediction as DW’s lexicographic lying costs. For example,
assume that there are two messages in the alphabet, m and m′, such that m′
is slightly harder to pronounce than m and bears an additional lexicographic
“pronunciation cost.” This discontinuity implies that these two messages can-
not both be used in any equilibrium, and hence only efficient outcomes are
stable.
I conclude by arguing why discontinuity of preferences may not be an ap-
pealing assumption in an evolutionary setup. The standard approach in the
evolutionary literature (see, e.g., Maynard Smith, 1982) is that preferences are
fitnesses (reproductive success). As argued by Samuelson & Swinkels (2003),
the fitness function should allow continuous trade-offs over various objectives,
and lexicographic constructions are interesting only if they provide conve-
nient approximations for cases in which preferences are continuous, but some
considerations are much more important than others. This note shows that
5 Moreover, this result holds regardless of the relative magnitude of the lying costs and
the mutation barriers (as defined in Samuelson & Swinkels, 2003).
8lexicographic lying costs do not provide a convenient approximation in the
current setup.
Another approach is that only material preferences are fitnesses, while ly-
ing aversion has no direct effect on fitness, and hence it might be lexicographic.
However, I demonstrate that even in this case it is problematic to perform a
static stability analysis with lexicographic preferences. The problem arises be-
cause a dynamically stable state does not have to be a Nash equilibrium of the
lexicographic game (unlike in continuous games, in which all the dynamically
stable state are Nash equilibria; see Nachbar, 1990).
Consider the following simple example: agents in a large population are
randomly matched and play at each round a Hawk-Dove game with lexico-
graphic preferences for playing hawk (as described in Figure 3). The type of
each agent determines his action - either a hawk or a dove. The frequency of
types evolves according to the replicator dynamics (Taylor & Jonker, 1978),
where the material payoffs are fitnesses. Every so often, a randomly chosen
agent switches his type if he strictly prefers the other type (given the aggre-
gate behavior of the population). One can see that the population converges
from any initial state towards (0.5, 0.5), and then remains forever in a small
neighborhood of this state, even though (0.5, 0.5) is not a Nash equilibrium of
the lexicographic game (which admits no symmetric Nash equilibria).6
Similarly, one can extend this dynamic analysis to coordination games with
pre-play communication and show that strategy σ∗ (or a small neighborhood
around it) is stable in various plausible evolutionary dynamics regardless of
the exact way in which the small lying aversion is modeled; in particular, σ∗
is dynamically stable (though not a Nash equilibrium) with a lexicographic
lying aversion.
6 The argument would remain the same even if there were symmetric Nash equilibria
(e.g., (0.5, 0.5) also remains stable if one adds a third strategy, which is a pure symmetric
Nash equilibrium).
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dove hawk dove hawk
dove 2 1 dove 0 0
hawk 3 0 hawk 1 1
pi (material payoffs) w (secondary payoffs)
Fig. 3: Hawk-Dove game with lexicographic preferences for playing hawk. The
game admits no Nash equilibria. The strategy (0.5, 0.5) is stable in
plausible evolutionary dynamics.
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